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McGuiness: Village of Willowbrook

THE IMPACT OF VILLAGE OF WILLOWBROOK
V. OLECH 1 ON DISPARATE TREATMENT
CLAIMS
2

J. Michael McGuinness

Good afternoon. I am here to address equal protection
law and Village of Willowbrook v. Olech.3 Willowbrook is the
latest word from the Supreme Court on one of the most
fascinating issues of our time. Willowbrook is also the first case
in at least ten years that the Supreme Court has had the occasion

to touch upon this issue.
The issue is this: to what extent does the Equal Protection

clause afford a right or a remedy to a victim of disparate4
treatment where the victim is not a member of a suspect class?
Most of us recall the traditional suspect class cases and legislative
classification schemes. What I have grappled with for the past
'120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000).
2

B.A., cum laude, Economics, University of North Carolina, 1979; J.D.,

North Carolina Central University, 1983; post-graduate study, National Law
Center, George Washington University, 1984-85. Member: United States
Supreme Court Bar, the Massachusetts Bar, the District of Columbia Bar, the
North Carolina Bar. Mr. McGuinness is a private practitioner with offices in
His firm concentrates in
Elizabethtown, N.C. and Washington, D.C.
constitutional and civil rights litigation, employment and labor relations, law
enforcement civil liability claims, personal injury cases, and some general
litigation. Further information about Mr. McGuinness and his law practice
can be obtained on his web site at: www.mcguinnesslaw.com.
3 120 S. Ct. at 1073. For some more recent interpretations of Willowbrook,
see Cruz v. Town of Cicero, 275 F.3d 579, 586-89 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming
verdict on Willowbrook claim); Carlin v. Village of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494
(2nd Cir. 2001); Jackson v. Burke, 256 F.3d 93, 97 (2nd Cir. 2001); Shipp v.
McMahon, 234 F.3d 907 (5th Cir. 2000). While Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000) did not cite Willowbrook, it provides some potentially fertile ground
for non-suspect class equal protection claims.
4 Id. at 1074.
5 See J. Michael McGuinness, Equal Protection for Non-Suspect Class
Victims of Governmental Misconduct: Theory and Proof of Disparate
Treatment and Arbitrariness Claims, 18 CAMPBELL L. REv. 333, 334 n.9

(1991).
[L]egislative classification schemes are frequently the subject
of equal protection challenge ....

In the classic legislative
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sixteen or seventeen years in the trenches, however, is the more
typical Equal Protection problem that arises when you have a real
person who is deprived of some benefit,, privilege, license,
permit, or job, and his or her claim does not hinge on being a
member of a suspect class. These types of problems are very
common. After Willowbrook, these types of claims are probably
going to flood the state and federal courts.
Please consider a couple of examples of the types of
claims that Willowbrook addresses. Sheriff Joe McQueen of
Wilmington, North Carolina is a litigant in one of the cases I
have handled in my native Southland.6 He has proclaimed that

context, equal protection generally mandates that
classifications not be based upon impermissible criteria or
arbitrarily used to burden a group of individuals ....
Under 'traditional' equal protection analysis when
classification schemes are in issue, a multi-tiered system of
review with three levels of scrutiny has been enunciated by
the Supreme Court.[citing JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 14.2 (4 1ed. 1991)...

the Supreme Court... adhere[s] to the deferential rationality
test where the matter in issue involves general economic or
social matters. Under these tests, as long as there is a
rational basis for the governmental action, the court will not
invalidate the governmental action ..
. The second type of
equal protection review is referred to as 'strict scrutiny.'
This standard generally applies where there is a 'suspect
classification' or when there is a 'fundamental right' in issue.
Classifications based upon race, national origin and alienage
are generally held to constitute suspect classifications ....
Where a suspect class or a fundamental rights is in issue, the
government must prove a compelling governmental interest
in order to uphold the classification .

. .

. The Court has

also enunciated a third test known as 'intermediate scrutiny.'
Under this approach the court will not uphold a classification
unless it has a 'substantial relationship' to an 'important'

governmental interest.

This test has been applied by the

Court in cases involving gender and illegitimacy.

See J. Michael McGuinness, The Impact of Willowbrook on Equal
Protection & Selective Enforcement Claims, in 16 TH ANNUAL SECTION 1983
6

CIvIL RiGHTs LrrIGATION 469, 471 (Practicing Law Institute, 2000) (referring
to Benson v. McQueen, E.D.N.C. 7:98-CV-164-DEN (deposition testimony)).
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God put him in office, and his employees serve at his whim.7
What I want you to consider is: is that consistent with equal
protection? Secondly, I also want you to consider whether a law
enforcement officer or a public employee can be fired because he
or she is a redneck, when other similarly situated employees of
other social classes are not so terminated. Finally, think about a
scenario where you have a law enforcement officer and a couple
of firefighters who participate in a parade. 8 In essence they
perform a racial skit to draw attention to the problem of
discrimination in their neighborhood. 9 Others who were present
thought they were making fun of African Americans. 10 Suppose
the mayor, for the first time in the history of the city, orders the
police commissioner to fire these public employees." The mayor
intervenes in this case, and in this case only, because he has no
authority under the law of his jurisdiction to get involved in such
basic personnel matters. The mayor's name is Mr. Giuliani and
the case is Locurto v. Giuliani.12 So these problems present
themselves not just with country sheriffs in the South, they
present themselves right in this City with the same type of
attitudes and the same types of prejudices.
To begin with, there is a formula that I derived from
Willowbrook and the antecedent cases that is as follows: disparate
treatment plus arbitrariness equals a violation of equal protection.
That is as simple as I can make it. There is a 1999 Second Circuit
case, Muller v. Costello,13 which boils the black letter rule down
better than any other case. In Muller, the court stated that the
Equal Protection clause prohibits arbitrary and irrational
7 Id.

See also J. Michael McGuinness, Decisions of the Past Decade Have
Expanded Equal Protection Beyond Suspect Class, 72 N.Y. ST. B.J. 36, 37
(Feb. 2000).
8 See Locurto v. Giuliani, 95 F. Supp. 2d 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
9 Id. at 162. The officers wore "black face" and rode on top of a float
entitled "Black to the Future."
10Id. at 164.

"A tape of the parade depicting the ...

float was aired on

CBS... The media portrayed the float as racist."
" Id. "In response to the incident, Mayor Giuliani stated that any city
employee involved in the float would be fired."
12 95 F. Supp. 2d at 161.
'" 187 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1999).
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discrimination even if no suspect class or fundamental right is
implicated.

14

History and Development of Irrationaland Arbitrary Claims
Let us now look at some of the history leading up to
Willowbrook. We all remember Yick Wo v. Hopkins.15 In fact,
Yick Wo was a suspect class case. 16 Language developed in Yick
Wo was subsequently adopted in non-suspect class cases. 17 That
language essentially provides that the Constitution does not leave
room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary
power. 18 That language was followed in 1944 by the United
States Supreme Court in Snowden v Hughes.' 9 Essentially,
Snowden set up the following rule: an Equal Protection violation
might be premised upon deliberate selective enforcement based
Id. at 309. "It is an established principle of constitutional law that the
Equal Protection Clause protects against class or group-based invidious
discrimination. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits 'arbitrary and irrational
discrimination' even if no suspect class or fundamental right is implicated."
(citing Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 83 (1988)). See
also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-34 (1996); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 413 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
15 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
16 Id. Yick Wo, as well as the other applicants in the case, were citizens of
14

China.
17 See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944); Oyler v. Boyles, 368
U.S. 448 (1962). See also McFarland v. American Sugar, 241 U.S. 79, 86-87
(1916). The Court found that a statute that "bristled with severities that touch
the plaintiff alone" was arbitrary and a violation of equal protection.
McFarland,241 U.S. at 86-87.
's Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370.
When we consider the nature and the theory of our
institutions and government ...

they do not leave room for

the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power..
. The very idea that one may be compelled to hold his life, or
the means of living, or any material right essential to the
enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems
intolerable in any country where freedom prevails ....
[I] ntentional or purposeful discrimination..
'9 Snowden, 321 U.S. at 8. "
may . . . be shown by extrinsic evidence showing a discriminatory design to
favor one individual or class over another."
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upon unjustifiable standards. 20 However, the Court did not
define what it meant by unjustifiable standards. That was left for
the circuit courts. Subsequently, in 1962, the Court held in Oyler
v. Boles,2 1 that Equal Protection prohibits discrimination on the
22
grounds of race, religion, or "other arbitrary classifications.",
These cases suggest some breadth in the different areas where
you can premise a disparate treatment or selective enforcement
case.
Examining the circuit court history, the Second Circuit
has probably led the country in this area since its 1946 decision in
Burt v. The City of New York. 23 Judge Learned Hand wrote the

Burt decision and it is still a case that is frequently cited by
circuit courts that get involved with these issues. Essentially,
Burt involved an architect who thought that he was not being
given fair and equal treatment as compared with other applicants.
He contended that city officials selected him for oppressive
measures, unconditionally approving the applications of others,
but denying his application.24 Judge Hand essentially concluded
that because the plaintiff was singled out for unlawful oppression
based upon a deliberate misinterpretation and abuse of statutory
power, he had a valid constitutional claim. 25 The denial did not
have anything whatsoever to do with a suspect class. That
involved a singling out of an individual for arbitrary and
unjustifiable reasons.
20

Id. at 8-9. "The unlawful administration by state officers of a state statute

. . .is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be . ..an

element of intentional or purposeful discrimination."
21

368 U.S. 448 (1962).

Id. at 456.
156 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1946). Burt was before Circuit Judges L. Hand,
Swan, and Chase. Judge Hand wrote the opinion.
24 Id. Burt alleged that officials "deliberately misinterpreted and abused their
statutory power" in denying his application. Burt also alleged that officials
selected him alone "for these oppressive measures, unconditionally approving
the applications of other architects, similarly situated."
25 Id. at 792.
"[I]f a complaint charges a state officer, not only with
deliberately misinterpreting a statute against the plaintiff, but also with
purposely singling out him alone for that misinterpretation, it is good against
demurrer."
22

23
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Getting a little closer to modern times, in 1980 the Second
Circuit decided the modern "granddaddy" case in this area,
LeClair v. Saunders.26 The standard that, the Second Circuit
enunciated in LeClair, which was uniformly followed in about all
the circuits, including my circuit, 27 was that selective treatment
claims may be premised upon intent to inhibit or punish the
exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent
to injure a person.28 That is the language that you will
fundamentally see in the numerous other circuits that followed
Leclair.29

Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit embraced
this doctrine in the 1990s, and it is my belief that several of his
decisions brought Willowbrook to the Supreme Court.3 °
Willowbrook was, in fact, his decision in the Seventh Circuit.31
The leading case prior to Willowbrook was Esmail v.
Macrane.32 I would suggest that you read Esmail when you have
a chance to. The reason I say that is because when you actually
627 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
See Canady v. City of Wilson, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21041 (E.D.N.C.
1998); Jetstream Aero v. New Hanover County, No. 88-1748, 1989 WL
100644 (4th Cir. 1989).
28Leclair, 627 F.2d at 609-10.
[L]iability in [this] type of equal protection case should
depend on proof that (1) the person, compared with others
similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2) that such
selective treatment was based on impermissible
considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or
punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or
bad faith intent to injure a person.
29 See, e.g., Yerardi's Moody Street Restaurant & Lounge, Inc. v.
Board of
Selectmen of the Town of Randolph, 878 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1989); Latrieste
Restaurant and Cabaret Inc. v. Village of Port Chester, 40 F.3d 587 (2d Cir.
1994); Smith v. Eastern New Mexico Medical Center, 1995 U.S. app. LEXIS
35920 (10th Cir. 1995) (reported in table form at 72 F.3d 138).
30 See Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussed infra);
Indiana State Teacher's Ass'n v. Board of School Commissioners, 101 F.3d
1179, 1181-82 (7th Cir. 1996).
3 Olech v.Village of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386 (7th Cir. 1998) (Olech
was before Chief Judge Posner, and Circuit Judges Cummings and Eschbach.
The opinion was by Chief Judge Posner.).
32 53 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 1995).
26
27
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read Willowbrook, you will find that it is devoid of much
analysis. It has virtually nothing to say about the facts of the
case. Even if you go back and look at what the Seventh Circuit
had to say,33 or examine the district court opinion,34 there is
virtually nothing said about the facts of the case. If you read
Esmail, however, you will see how it works in the "real" world.
Esmail essentially involved an individual who ran liquor
stores and came across a problem with the mayor, who was the
judge, jury and executioner for those who dealt with liquor
licenses in that city. 35 Mr. Esmail pled a long list of examples of
other individuals who had their applications routinely granted, yet
for some reason Mr. Esmail was having a problem.36
Essentially, the problem was traced back to the fact that in the
mid-1980s, Mr. Esmail had appealed from a previous denial of
one of his liquor licenses. 3 What we often learn in this line of
cases is that when you aggravate your bureaucracy and become a
litigant, they will often make you pay for that in subsequent
times. That is what the courts have come to recognize as the
vindictiveness basis for an Equal Protection claims, and that is
38
essentially what Judge Posner said the problem was in Esmail.
Willowbrook did away with any contended need for vindictiveness
in these cases, and instead opened the door to claims based solely
on an arbitrary and irrational act.
I had a case before the Fourth Circuit, Edwards v. City of
Goldsboro,39 that I thought was going to be the winning case in
that circuit on this issue. It was interesting for a number of
reasons. Essentially, what happened was that a police sergeant
wanted to teach an off-duty course mandated by the North

33 Willowbrook, 160 F.3d at 386.

34 Olech v. Village of Willowbrook, 1998 WL 196455 (N.D. 11l.).

Esmail, 53 F.3d at 177.
id.
37 Id. at 178.
38 Id. at 179. "The distinctive feature here ... is that the unequal treatment
is alleged to have been the result solely of a vindictive campaign by the
mayor."
'9178 F.3d 231 (4th Cir. 1999).
"

36
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Carolina Concealed Handgun Statute 4° shortly after it was passed
by the North Carolina General Assembly. 41 The chief of police
was an adamant opponent of the Concealed Handgun law,
lobbying the general assembly against it. When my client chose
to teach this lawfully-mandated course required by state law, 42 the
chief of police suspended his employment. When I deposed him,
his response and reasoning for why he suspended the sergeant
was that the underlying state law was "bad law." Keep in mind
that virtually every other employee in the history of the City of
Goldsboro who had ever sought any off-duty employment or selfemployment was permitted to do so. You can teach political
science in the city of Goldsboro, but you cannot teach a course
about carrying concealed weapons.
I thought we had a great Equal Protection case until I got
to the Fourth Circuit and learned to the contrary. We won the
case on expression grounds,43 which, in my judgment is a much
better cause of action for a civil rights action where there is some
protected expression. However, the court rejected the retaliation

40

N.C. GEN. STAT. §§14.415.10 - 415.23 (2000). The statute states in

pertinent part: "Any person who has a concealed handgun permit may carry a
concealed handgun unless otherwise specifically prohibited by law."
41 Edwards, 178 F. 3d at 238-39.
42 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-415.12(a) (2000). The statute states in pertinent
part:
The sheriff shall issue a [concealed handgun] permit to an
applicant if the applicant qualifies under the following
criteria: (1) The applicant is a citizen of the United States and
has been a resident of the State 30 days or longer . . . (2)

The applicant is 21 years of age or older. (3) The applicant
does not suffer from a physical or mental infirmity that
prevents the safe handling of a handgun. (4) The applicant
has successfully completed an approved firearms safety and
training course which involves the actual firing of handguns
and instruction on the laws of this State governing the
carrying of a concealed handgun and the use of deadly force.
41 Id. at 248. "[T]he Defendant's threat to terminate Sergeant Edward's,
if
he resumed conducting the concealed handgun safety course, was intended to
chill his right to engage in ...

protected expression."
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theory, therefore essentially rejecting the Leclair doctrine. 44 In
addition, with regard to the Esmail point of vindictiveness and the
language that related to the official's complaint of harassment, the
Fourth Circuit contended that we had not pled enough in our
complaint.45 We are still bewildered about that. However,
Edwards' equal protection analysis does not survive Willowbrook.
Willowbrook provides a new workable standard, if the Circuit
Courts will only apply it reasonably.
Willowbrook and its Aftermath
Now, on to Willowbrook. Essentially, what was involved
in Willowbrook was that Ms. Olech and some of her neighbors
were having water problems. Her well had broken down and she
46
sought to connect to the municipal water system. In order to do
that, the City required her to grant an easement to the City so
they could take care of the appropriate roadwork.4 7 The standard
and custom and policy required that applicants grant a fifteen-foot
easement. The City insisted upon a thirty-three-foot easement for
Ms. Olech and her neighbors. 48 When you track back to the
44 Id. at 250. "Sergeant Edwards' Equal Protection claim is . . . a mere
rewording of his First Amendment retaliation claim . . . [and] 'A pure or
generic retaliation claim . . . simply does not implicate the Equal Protection

Clause.' Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344, 1354 (11th Cir. 1995)."
45 Id. "Sergeant Edwards has not alleged that the Defendants disciplined him
Rather, all
because they harbored animosity toward him personally.
was in
that
the
discipline
allegations in the compliant point to the conclusion
and
freedom
of
of
free
speech
Sergeant
Edwards'
exercise
retaliation for

association under the First Amendment."
4 Willowbrook, 120 S. Ct. at 1074. Olech's home was located between two

other homes. The Willowbrook water main only extended to the northern
boundary of one of those neighbors, Brinkman. Brinkman and the other

neighbor, the Zimmers, also got their water from private wells located on each
of their properties. When Olech's well broke down, she was forced to hook

up to the Zinimers' well temporarily by attaching an overground rubber hose
to the well. Subsequently, Olech, the Zimmers and Brinkman all asked

Willowbrook to hook their homes up to the municipal water system.
Willowbrook, 1998 WL 196455, at *1.
47

id.

48 Id.
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difference in treatment and the motivation, it comes down to this:
she had sued them once before a few years earlier. 49 Although
there was an argument for vindictiveness in the case, the Court's
holding was much more simplistic. The holding was simply that
the City's demand for the larger easement constituted an
irrational and wholly arbitrary act, and that was sufficient to state
a claim for what the Court called traditional Equal Protection
50
analysis.
What appears to have spun off since Willowbrook is the
whole issue of motive. Professor Chemerinsky had something to
say about motive in an article in Trial Magazine, 5' and two of the
circuit courts have discussed it as well. 2 Do you really have to
prove some improper motive in order to state an Equal Protection
claim? I believe very strongly that a fair reading of Willowbrook,
and Professor Chemerinsky agrees with me, held that subjective
ill-will or bad motive is not required. 3 If that is the case,
Willowbrook has slammed open the door of Equal Protection like
we have never seen it in this country. That is why I say that
Willowbrook is probably one of the most fascinating decisions of
the term.
However, before the Willowbrook's was dry, our southern
circuits decided they were not going to stand for it. In particular,
in a case called Bryan v. The City of Madison,54 which was a land

Id. Olech and her two neighbors, the Zimmers and Brinkman, had
previously sued Willowbrook for damage to their property that had resulted
from storm water. Olech and the Zimmers were successful in their suits, and
Brinkman's claims were dismissed. Wllowbrook, 1998 WL 196455, at *2
n.3.
5G1d. at 1075.
51 Erwin Chemerinsky, Suing the Government for Arbitrary Actions, 36
TRIAL 89 (May 1, 2000). "The Court's decision is clear that an allegation of a
retaliatory motive or subjective ill will is unnecessary."
49

52 See Bryan v. The City of Madison, 213 F.3d 267 (5th Cir. 2000); Hilton
v. City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2000).
53 Chemerinsky, supra note 50, at 89.
"[I]t should be noted that the
allegation of improper motivation . . . was expressly disavowed by the
majority as relevant to the decision."
54 213 F.3d 267 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001).
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use case that affirmed summary judgment for the City, 55 there
was a footnote that stated that Willowbrook did not change the
Fifth Circuit requirement of improper motive. 56 I am astounded
that a circuit court would state something so directly
contradictory to what the Supreme Coutt has held. However,
there is a southern tradition of doing that.
Subsequently, Judge Posner authored in Hilton v. City of
Wheeling.57 Hilton involved an issue of police protection. A
gentleman apparently had a dog that was aggravating neighbors,
who in turn repeatedly called the police to complain. The police
had to come to the neighborhood eighty times in a seven-year
period to deal with these disturbances. 58 In Hilton, the Seventh
Circuit observed that the selective withdrawal of police protection
is a "prototypical denial of equal protection'*59 However, it was
held that because of the absence of evidence of an improper
motive, the plaintiff could not recover. 60 Again, I am astounded
because that is not what the Supreme Court said in Willowbrook.
It appears that the Supreme Court went one step further in
Willowbrook than Judge Posner would have them go in Hilton.
There is a concurring opinion in Willowbrook by Justice
Remember however that
Breyer that addresses motive. 6'
Willowbrook was unanimous. What Justice Breyer said in his
concurrence was that this extra factor, ill-will, which was present
in the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Willowbrook, was what
essentially places the case "over the rail." Breyer said ill-will
was the extra factor that made the equal protection claim

s Id. at 270-71.
SId. at 277 n. 14. "[Wil l owbrook] does not... alter our requirement of an
improper motive, such as racial animus, for selective enforcement claims."
" 209 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1080 (2001). Hilton
was before Chief Judge Posner, and circuit Judges Flaum and Williams. Chief
Judge Posner wrote the opinion.
8 Id. at 1006.
'9Id.

6
61

at 1007.

Id. at 1007-08.

Willowbrook, 120 S. Ct. at 1075. (Breyer, J., concurring).
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actionable. 62 However, the majority decision expressly disavows
that. 63
That is my reading of it, as well as Professor
64 I am afraid that the southern
Chemerinsky's reading of it.
circuits are not going to follow what the Supreme Court has set
forth in its opinion, which is not unlike what happened after
Brown v. Board of Education65 in the 1950s. Time will tell. If
the lower courts embrace what Willowbrook clearly stands for,
much more equal protection will be available to victims of
governmental misconduct.
Proving a Disparate Treatment Case
With that background in mind, how do you prove one of
these cases?
You do it through good old-fashioned hard
lawyering. How you investigate the case from the outset is what
matters most. Good lawyering starts with thorough investigation
and discovery in disparate treatment cases. You can also expect
that the defendants are going to fight discovery with every
assertable privilege they can think of. You have to file motions
to compel. You have to get every personnel file, chase every
lead, and run down the witnesses. I contend, however, that the
right kind of lawyering will win the case even if you have to
prove a bad motive because even the Giulianis of the world will
give you the bad motive if you look far enough. In that case
the
66
Post.
the
and
Times
York
New
the
bad motive showed up in
Id. (Breyer, J., concuring). "[Tihe presence of that added factor [ill-will]
in this case is sufficient to minimize any concern about transforming run-ofthe-mill zoning cases into cases of constitutional right."
63 Id.
"These allegations, quite apart from the Village's subjective
motivation, are sufficient to state a claim for relief under traditional equal
62

protection analysis."
64 Chemerinsky, supra note 50, at 89.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
66 Locurto, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 164.
Giuliani was quoted in the Friday, September
edition of The New York Times as stating, 'I've
Commissioners Safir and Von Essen . . . and we
that any police officer, firefighter or other city
involved in this disgusting display of racism
65

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol17/iss3/7
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I have a suggested twenty-two point checklist on how to
prove improper motive in these cases.67 the first thing that you
removed from positions of responsibility immediately. .. .'
[In addition,] [o]n Saturday, September 12, 1998, Mayor
Giuliani stated publicly, '[t]he only way this guy [Locurto]
gets back on the police force is if the Supreme Court of the
United States tells us to put him back.'
67 See J. MICHAEL MCGUINNESS, SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS
LITIGATION AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 2000 at 519-21.
The following factors have been relied upon as a basis for a
sufficient inference of a retaliatory or improper motive to
establish a violation of equal protection...
(1) Governmental decisionmaker's attitude regarding the
conduct of the individual or employee. A hostile attitude
suggests an improper motive.
(2) Disparate treatment, particularly unequal discipline
among employees or individuals.
(3) Reduced employee evaluations or changed conditions
after engaging in protected conduct.
(4) Manner, tone and language of how the individual is
informed of the deprivation.
(5) Inadequate investigation of allegations surrounding the
adverse action or other deprivation. Failing to review
and consider all facts purportedly in the individual's
favor suggests arbitrariness.
(6) Deviations from procedures or policies.
(7) Lack of reasonable warnings or notice of alleged
violation or noncompliance.
(8) Temporal proximity. Timing of the adverse action
following engagement of protected activity.
(9) The magnitude of the alleged offense. Comparisons of
punishment showing that the employee or applicant has
been more harshly punished than others suggests an
improper motive.
(10)History of employee's work performance. A drastic
alleged decline in performance is suspect.
(11) Investigation or scrutiny of employee or applicant's
conduct following protected conduct.
(12)The employer's creation of the problem that is
supposedly the basis for the employer's criticism of the
employee.
(13) Subjectivity in termination or rejection criteria.
(14) Pretext.
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want to look for is what the governmental decision-maker's
attitude was. Was it hostile when your client was fired or when
that permit was denied? Was your client cursed out in the
process? If so, when you "nail that proof down," you need to
put evidence of the hostility in the affidavit so that the Appellate
Court, down the road, will see that it is not some innocuous
statement or some profane remark taken out of context. You
need to get it into the record that your client was "chewed out."
These are the nebulous points that you look for when you do not
have that sheriff saying, "you all serve at my whim." You look
for reduced evaluations of employees after there has been some
dispute with the decision-maker. You look for the manner, tone,
and language of how the individual was informed of the
deprivation.
You also look to determine if there has been an adequate
investigation into the dispute in personnel cases. All of my clients
are allegedly insubordinate. I hear it in virtually every case.
You want to get into the details of that and determine if there was
an investigation into the alleged insubordination. You look for
deviations from routine procedures, for whether or not there were
warnings or notices of the noncompliance, and obviously, for the
time sequence. If your client has done something to aggravate
the bureaucracy, how soon after did your client suffer the denial
(15)Employee's lack of history of the alleged basis of
termination.
(16) Changed ground for the adverse action.
(17)The failure to adhere to its own procedural or
substantive regulations.
(18) Undue delay in processing applications.
(19)Changes in the course of dealings among the parties.
(20)Changes in qualifications of rules after commencement
of selection process.
(21) A secret paper trail, without notice to the employee.
(22) Delayed articulation of alleged justification.
Analysis of these factors yields information from which
a trier of fact can determine the essential question of
arbitrariness.
See also McGuinness, Representing Law Enforcement Officers in Personnel
Disputes and Employment Litigation, 77 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1 (2000).
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of the benefit? How close is the protected activity to the adverse
action? You want to look for the subjective criteria, and at the
history of the employment by the individual, as well as the
supervisors, involved. You want to look for any sort of unusual
time sequences, any significant delays that are different from
routine and changes in qualifications after the posting of the
position. That still comes up in case after case after case.
If you learn from your client that there is some impending
problem, for example, if there has been a suspension or the client
suspects there is going to be a termination, what can you do to
capture the evidence and preserve the truth? When my clients are
fired in the South, they don't allow lawyers to come in and argue
or present facts or evidence. The only tool that I have to
preserve the truth and to capture what goes on in those back-room
"whip sessions" is a wire.
There is a lot of controversy about the use of a wire. The
first thing you have to do in each and every case is you have to
determine whether it is lawful in that particular jurisdiction for
your client to wear a wire. For example, in the State of Florida it
is unlawful to wear a wire. 68 When the State of North Carolina
sent me to prosecutor's school many years ago, they taught me to
use that device in drug cases under the theory we are going to let
the jury know the whole unadulterated truth. I have continued to
do so since becoming a civil lawyer, and it works. The first
thing you have to do is plan for your client to wear a wire and
then determine if they can do it and under what circumstances.
We capture the truth by wearing a wire so they cannot escape
from the truth, and it can make a tremendous difference in the
case.
One final technique that a good law enforcement officer
taught me was that cops are taught to take backup weapons when
they go out on their missions, and good investigators are taught to
61

See FLA. STAT. § 934.03 (2000). The statute states in pertinent part:

[Any person who . . . [i]ntentionally intercepts . . . any wire, oral, or
electronic communication . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor . . . . " Id.

"Intercept" is defined as meaning "the aural or other acquisition of the
contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any
electronic, mechanical, or other device. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2510.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2001

15

Touro Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 3 [2001], Art. 7

610

TOURO LAWREVIEW

[Vol 17

take a second tape recorder. The reason is that in some of our
jurisdictions, after we have gone in, captured the proof, nailed
down the case, and the sheriff resigns and moves on, they
become a little less brutal in that jurisdiction the next time they go
into the back room. Sometimes they will ask our clients, "What
is that bulk in your pocket, son? I order you to remove that
recorder."
There was a case where the chief was just as
diplomatic and professional as he could be because he suspected a
wire. After he ordered that the recorder be taken out, and the
tape be removed, the chief went absolutely ballistic, which tape
recorder number two captured.
Conclusion
In summary, the sheriffs of the South and the mayors of
the North are all subject to the Equal Protection Clause.
Willowbrook is a fascinating case which represents a real piece of
ammunition to challenge the tactics of those who abuse
governmental power.
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